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I. INTRODUCTION

There is an ongoing struggle between the rights of pharmaceutical
patent owners and those in desperate need of the drugs for whom they hold
the patents. Further technological innovation requires that there be
sufficient incentive to research and develop (R&D) new drugs, but once
these drugs are approved and protected by patent law, they should be made
available to people who will suffer without them.' In this regard, a system
* Clark A.D. Wilson is a Registered Patent Attorney with the Intellectual Property law firm
Malin, Haley & DiMaggio, P.A. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Clark is a 2001 graduate of the
University of Miami where he received a B.S. in Civil Engineering and a B.S. in Environmental
Engineering. Clark is a 2005 graduate of the Florida Coastal School of Law. Clark would like to
thank Professor Christopher Roederer, Professor Zahie EI-Kouri, and Benjamin Richard of the
Florida Coastal School of Law. Clark would like to thank Andres Seiter of the World Bank Group.
Clark would finally like to thank his parents.
1. PharmaceuticalPatents and the TRIPs Agreement, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/tripse/pharmpatente.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
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of patent rights which is too protective will hinder availability by
restricting widespread dissemination to the public.2 On the other hand, a
system of patent rights which is too weak will not encourage innovation
and new technological research.3 Thus, for the billions of the world's
underprivileged, it is vital that a proper balance be achieved which benefits
both sides.4
In this Article, I will attempt to make sense of the current confusion
surrounding pharmaceutical patent rights under the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs).5 Section I of this Article
will discuss the current restrictions enforced by the TRIPs Agreement.
Section III will contain my analysis of TRIPs, the conflict between
developed nations and developing nations, and conclude that, without a
greater sense of global responsibility by rich nations, the TRIPs
Agreement will act merely as a hindrance on the fight to eradicate disease
in the developing world.
II. BACKGROUND

A patent granted by a country essentially prevents others from making,
using, or selling a particular invention for the limited period of twenty
years in that particular country in exchange for complete publication of the
technology protected by the patent.6 Patent protection is allowed for any
novel invention, whether a product or process.' In short, if a patent is
obtained, only the patent owner has the right to use it in the country which
granted the patent. However, with the growing importance of international
trade, the simple idea of patent protection has become the subject of global
economic and human rights initiatives.
When originally formed, the international economic organizations were
envisioned to be closely related to the U.N. system and human rights.8 In

2. Keith E. Maskus, IntellectualPropertyRights andEconomic Development, 32 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 471,474 (2000).
3. Id.
4. CHRISTOPHER ROEDERER & DARRELL MOELLENDORF, JURISPRUDENCE 609 (Juta & Co.
2004).
5. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement], art. 33, availableat http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/tagm3_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2005).
6. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5, art. 33.
7. Id. art. 27.1.
8. Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1399,
1417 (2003).
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1995 "the World Bank thus declared on the 50th Anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "'The world now accepts that
sustainable development is impossible without human rights.' 9 Further,
articles 25 and 27 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights conclude that
both the right of an inventor to enjoy the profit from intellectual property
(IP) rights and the right of humans to an adequate standard of living are
important and complementary rights promoted by the United Nations. 'oIn
response to the underlying theme of the U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights, the World Trade Organization (WTO) enacted TRtPs in 1994.1
However, the TRIPs Agreement continues to incite defiance and confusion
among the members of the WTO. Even though the requirements of TRIPs
more closely resemble the current patent laws of developed nations, many
argue that its objective is to provide a fair balance for all WTO member
nations.12
The TRIPs Agreement was established through negotiations between
developed countries that have strong IP laws and less-developed countries
that have weak, or no, IP laws. 3 The developed countries argued for
increased IP protection in the less-developed countries while the less-14
developed countries desired more access to the open market.
Additionally, the less-developed countries wanted more access to lifesaving medicines, which in many developing countries were not currently
available.
In essence, the underlying themes promoted by TRIPs are:
"(1)... minimum intellectual property rights protection through domestic
laws; (2) . . . effective enforcement of those rights; and (3) . . . ,
submission of disputes to the WTO Dispute Settlement System." 5 Article
7 of the TRIPs Agreement reiterates these themes:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and

9. Id. at 1416.
10. Striking a Balance: Patent Rights and Access to Drugs and Health Care, available at
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/publications/health-care.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005);
see also the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, arts. 25, 27, available at http://www.un.org/
Overview/rights.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
11. ROEDERER & MOELLENDORF, supra note 4, at 598.
12. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
685, 695 (2002).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. L. Danielle Tully, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPs Agreement and Developing
Countries after the DOHA Conference, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 134 (2003).
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to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.' 6
TRIPs, however, provides flexibility in achieving these goals by
allowing members to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health
. . . and to promote . . . their socio-economic and technological
development."17 Under the language of article 8.1 members can organize
their IP rules however they choose as long as they conform to the
standards set under the TRIPs Agreement.18 Simultaneously, article 8.2
allows a government to use appropriate measures to prevent a patent
owner from improperly abusing their patent rights to "unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology"
within the marketplace. 9 Such provisions allow a developing country
member to format its IP scheme to best match the particular needs of its
country.
In some cases, a country's human rights needs arguably outweigh the
importance of patent protection. TRIPs allows a government member of
the WTO to intentionally override a patent and use protected technology
through two provisions: a "public health license" and a "compulsory
license." Article 30 of TRIPs allows a government to grant public health
licenses to the extent that such action "does not unreasonably conflict with
a normal exploitation of the patent and does not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the patent owner.... ,,20
Alternatively, a compulsory license allows a party other than the patent
owner to produce the patented invention without the owner's permission. 1
Even though TRIPs allows compulsory licensing, developing country
members have been reluctant to implement such licensing because several
mandatory preconditions must be met, which often prove difficult for the
administrations of developing countries to satisfy. The granting state must
first request voluntary permission of use from the patent holder, then
restrict use of the compulsory license to predefined rationales, and then

16. TRIPs Agreement, supranote 5, art. 7.
17. Id. art. 8.1.
18. Peng Jiang, Comment, Fightingthe AIDS Epidemic: China's Options under the WTO
TRIPs Agreement, 13 ALB. L.J. ScL. & TECH. 223, 229 (2002).
19. TRIPs Agreement, supranote 5, art. 8.2.
20. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5, art. 30.
21. Sara M. Ford, CompulsoryLicensingProvisionsUnderthe TRIPs Agreement: Balancing
Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 945 (2000).
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"adequately remunerate" the patent holder for such use.22 The most
problematic prerequisite, however, is the requirement that the compulsory
licenses be used predominantly for the domestic market even if the nation
has no domestic manufacturing capacity. 23 Yet, TRIPs provides that when
a "national emergency or other extreme urgency" arises, a member is not
required to obtain prior authorization in order to grant a compulsory
license.24 Under such an emergency, the member is, however, limited to
non-commercial state-use and must notify the patent holder of such use.2
Those in favor of compulsory licensing urge that it will reduce foreign
dependence, encourage and establish domestic industry, increase
competition in the marketplace, and provide more access to patented
medicines. 26 The counter-argument presented by the critics of compulsory
licenses is that the definition of "national emergency" will be broad and
compulsory licenses will be granted for anything that can be categorized
as such.2 7 The reason that compulsory licensing is an issue of universal
concern is that when governments issue compulsory licenses, the likely
result is a sharp price reduction, similar to the introduction of other
competitive forces like generic drugs.28
A further alternative to compulsory licensing is the use of "parallel
imports" 29 and avoiding liability to the patent owner through "exhaustion
of rights."3 TRIPs has declared that issues related to parallel imports or
exhaustion of rights cannot be raised as a dispute in the WTO unless
"fundamental principals of discrimination are involved."'" Thus, these
alternative government actions are seemingly available actions if they
would be more effective than undertaking the process of acquiring a
compulsory license.

22. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 5,art. 31.
23. See id.
art. 31(f): "any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market ofthe Member authorizing such use..."); see also Hoachem Sun, A Wider Access
to PatentedDrugs Under the TRIPs Agreement, 21 B.U. INT'LL.J. 101, 114 (2003).
24. Jiang, supra note 18, at 232.
25. The Separate Doha DeclarationExplained, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/trips e/healthdeclexplne.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
26. Divya Murthy, The FutureofCompulsoryLicensing: Decipheringthe DohaDeclaration
on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1299, 1307-08 (2002).
27. Ford, supra note 21, at 966.
28. Id. at 946.
29. Jiang, supra note 18, at 232-33 ("Parallel imports" are drugs protected and sold in one
country then imported and sold to another country against the patent owner's permission).
30. Id. at 33 ("Exhaustion of Rights" means that after the patent owner has sold a batch of
his product, his rights on that particular batch cease).
31. The Separate Doha DeclarationExplained,supra note 25.
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After the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement, however, there remained
confusion about certain of its provisions. Consequently, the Doha
Ministerial Conference in November 2001 released a Declaration (Doha
Declaration) in an attempt to clarify the confusion. The Doha Declaration
focused on the growing public health issues affecting the developing and
least developed world, particularly with respect to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
other tropical diseases.33 For example, an important decision issued
through the Doha Declaration was the modification of the deadline for
complete TRIPs compliance to 2005 for developing countries and 2006 for
least-developed countries. Also, the Doha Declaration stated that the leastdeveloped countries were not required to issue pharmaceutical patents
until 2016 .3 This extra time period has allowed the least-developed
countries to attack their public health issues without fear of WTO sanction
and trade repercussions.
The Doha Declaration additionally provided clarification on issues
pertaining to compulsory licenses. Each member nation of the WTO has
been granted the freedom to determine the grounds upon which a
compulsory license will be granted.35 Further, confusion over the
definition of "national emergency" or "extreme urgency" was dispelled by
allowing each WTO member to determine what constituted such3 6 a
situation but stipulating that "public health crises" are such situations.
The Doha Declaration, unfortunately, failed to address the controversy
surrounding article 31 (f) of the TRIPs Agreement, which restricts the use
of compulsory licenses to "predominantly the domestic market."37 As a
result, on August 30, 2003, the General Council of the WTO released a
statement which attempted to clarify the confusion.3" In particular, part 2
of the statement provided the requirements a nation must meet before
being granted a waiver of the customary obligations for compulsory
licensing.39
32. Id.
33. Jiang, supra note 18, at 235.
34. The Separate DohaDeclarationExplained,supra note 25.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPs, PharmaceuticalPatents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A
Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 44 (2002).
38. Statement by General Council Chairperson Carlos Pdrez del Castillo, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news03_e/trips stat 28aug03 e.htm (last visited Oct. 4,2005).
39. Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the TRIPs Agreement and
Public Health, Decision of the General Council, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/405 (Aug. 30, 2003).
(2) "The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31 (f) of the TRIPs
Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory license
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This statement afforded many countries previously unable to
manufacture pharmaceuticals with the ability to rely on a regional trade
partner to produce the necessary medicine once production rights had been
granted by a compulsory license. The problem with the Doha Declaration
and the statement by the General Council is that they have no legally
binding weight in Dispute Settlement within the WTO and will merely be
used interpretively in cases involving TRIPs. 4 0 Thus, without firmly
established principles within the WTO, members who choose to grant
compulsory licenses still risk violating TRIPs.

to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical
product[s] and its export to an eligible importing Member in accordance with the
terms set out below in this paragraph:
(a) the eligible importing Member has made a notification to the Council for
TRIPs, that:
(i) specifies the names and expected quantities of the products needed;
(ii) confirms that the eligible importing Member... has established that it
has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the
products in question ... ; and
(iii) confirms that, where a pharmaceutical product is patented in its
territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory license in accordance
with Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement and the provisions of this Decision;
(b) the compulsory license issued by the exporting Member under this Decision
shall contain the following conditions:
(i) only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing
Member[s] may be manufactured... ;
(ii) products produced under the license shall be clearly identified as being
produced under the system ... ; and
(iii) before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website the...
quantities being supplied to each destination . . . and . . . the distinguishing
features of the products...
(3) Where a compulsory license is granted by an exporting Member under the
system set out in this Decision, adequate remuneration.., shall be paid.., to the
[patent holder]...
(4)... eligible importing Members shall take reasonable measures.., to prevent
re-exportation of the products that have actually been imported into their
territories under the system.
Id.
40. Alan 0. Sykes, Public Health and International Law: TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals,
Developing Countries,and the Doha "Solution, "3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 54 (2002).
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III. ANALYSIS

The TRIPs Agreement provides a sufficient foundation through which
to respect the wants and needs of both developed and underdeveloped
nations. However, pharmaceutical manufacturers remain adamant about
further increasing the strength of patent rights. Section A discusses why
the pharmaceutical industry should, but does not, focus its assets on drugs
vital to millions in the developing world. Section B presents an analysis of
how TRIPs and related IP treaties have been successful in resolving
disputes as well as protecting the vital interest of human rights. Examples
of particular conflicts show that the agenda of developed nations extends
beyond fair trade and public health. Section C argues that compulsory
licensing is essential for the effective fight against the spread of disease
and does not significantly harm patent holders' profit margins. Section D
argues that while patent protection is vital to the furtherance of
technological development, sufficient profits can be achieved without
foregoing global health concerns.
A. The Focus of the PharmaceuticalIndustry
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that particular terms in a
treaty must be "interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose."' As such, article 7 of the TRIPs
Agreement unambiguously requires the use of technological knowledge in
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and to a balance of
rights and obligations.42
Pharmaceutical companies argue that in order to produce new drugs
through R&D, they must make a substantial return of profit on drugs
already being sold. Therefore, with patent protection for twenty years, the
pharmaceutical company gains the necessary market exclusivity from
which they are able to reap a huge return. However, this exclusivity also
may tend to afford them the ability to set the price they desire; often this
price is very high. Frequently, however, more than half of the R&D
expenditure for new pharmaceuticals is funded by American tax dollars or
private philanthropy, thus relieving the pharmaceutical manufacturers of

41. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
42. Hoachem Sun, A Wider Access to PatentedDrugs Under the TRIPs Agreement, 21 B.U.
INT'LL.J. 101, 131 (2003).
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a significant cost burden.43 Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry
appears to have an ideal market situation providing it with a significant
opportunity to develop lifesaving drugs.
However, for pharmaceutical manufacturers, the recent trend has been
to develop "lifestyle" drugs, which produce a large profit in developed
countries, instead of drugs which may cure chronic diseases found mostly
in poor regions, but which lack a potential for large profit." For instance,
between 1975-1997, only one percent of newly patented medicines were
for arguably easily curable tropical diseases. 5 At the close of 1996, "only
eight drugs on the WHO's 7th Model List of Essential Drugs were still
of these were classified as
under patent protection in Europe and five
'complementary' rather than 'essential."' 46 Further, "the World Health
Organization claims that of the $56 billion spent globally on R&D in 1994,
only 0.2% was aimed at pneumonia, diarrheal maladies, and tuberculosis,
which together account for 18% of global illness.4 7 Due to a lack of
access or production of vital medicines, nearly ten million people die in
the developing world each year from infectious diseases.48 Most of these
people die from just six conditions: HIV/AIDS, malaria, measles,
pneumonia, tuberculosis, and various forms of dysentery.49 However, of
these six conditions, only HIV/AIDS is a relatively new condition.5 °
Therefore, it is entirely possible that if attention had been focused towards
the other five conditions, a cure for them would be presently available for
use.
One reason presented for this disparity has purely to do with the
assumed inadequacy of profit potential within the developing world.
Because of the claimed lack of purchasing power of those in the least
developed countries, the pharmaceutical companies claim they cannot

43. Grace K. Avedissian, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward
Compulsory Licensingof MedicalInventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism," 18 AM. U. INT'L
L. REv. 237, 280 (2002).
44. See Thomas W. Croghan & Patricia M. Pittman, The Medicine Cabinet: What's In It,
Why, and Can We Change the Contents?; A Frameworkfor Aligning Business Objectives with
Medical Need, HEALTH AFF. (Jan.-Feb. 2004).
45. ROEDERER & MOELLENDORF, supra note 4, at 594.
46. Jean 0. Lanjouw, The Introduction of PharmaceuticalProduct Patents in India:
"HeartlessExploitation of the Poor and Suffering"?, (NBER Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 6366, 1997), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6366 (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
47. Maskus, supra note 2, at 488.
48. Hoen, supra note 37, at 27.
49. Croghan & Pittman, supra note 44.
50. Geoff Dyer, Africa Aids Crisis Raises Ethical Questions Over Drugs Deal, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 30, 2004, at 27.
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make enough money by selling their drugs. Thus, the pharmaceutical
companies do not produce drugs needed in these regions. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers argue that because the Gross Domestic Product of the
developing world is only one-fifth of the world total, the developing world
represents only one-fifth of the potential global market." This argument
is based entirely on purchasing power, rather than demand for product. 2
A recent World Health Organization estimate stated that nearly ninety-five
percent of the world's HIV/AIDS victims reside in developing countries;
thus, the demand for vaccines and medication is great.53
B. Success of TRIPs in Dispute Resolution
Countries of the developed world generally have strong patent regimes.
However, few developing countries have such patent regimes. TRIPs
attempts to reconcile this situation by providing a level of patent protection
desired by pharmaceutical manufacturers, which will also increase the
availability and advancement of medicines within countries previously
lacking such patent regimes.
Effectively, the members of the WTO have a set period of time to
establish and enforce the requirements of TRIPs before they are
sanctioned. The larger developing countries (India, Brazil, and China)
must comply with TRIPs by 2005." 4 Least-developed countries (those of
Sub-Saharan Africa) must comply by 2006 in general and have an
extended compliance deadline of 2016 for pharmaceutical patents.
Additionally, article 67 of TRIPs requires developed countries to assist
developing countries in creating and modifying their IP schemes, including
assistance in prevention of abuse of such schemes.56 Ideally, such
assistance should be carried out with solely the interests of the developing
country in mind.
However, some critics claim that TRIPs, in fact, reduces a developing
country's access to technology and discourages new technology needed for
economic growth. 7 Assuming this assumption is valid, the balance of

51. Sykes, supranote 40, at 65.
52. Id.
53. Andrea M. Curti, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:An Unlikely Weapon in
the FightAgainst AIDS, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 469, 475 (2001).
54. WTO, TRIPs and Pharmaceuticalpatents, WTO OMC, Fact Sheet (Sept. 2003)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet
pharm00_e.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
55. Id.
56. Tully, supranote 15, at 138.
57. Id. at 142.

2005]

THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: IS IT BENEFICIAL TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD, OR SIMPL YA TOOL

253

power must not be leveraged solely by the pharmaceutical companies and
developed nations. In exchange for the strong patent rights manufacturers
receive they must provide a sufficient benefit to society. 8 In fact, it would
violate the objectives of the WTO to threaten a needy country with trade
sanctions restricting access to vital drugs simply for the purpose of
maintaining profitability.5 9 This is because all WTO members must
comply with TRIPs article 30 which generally articulates a policy interest
in promoting public health.6° Additionally, treatments for widespread
conditions are valuable to society as a whole and will provide significant
profits if focus is provided through R&D.6
Recently, several developing countries have simultaneously felt the
enforcement powers of TRIPs and the criticism of the developed world as
a result of their actions. In some of these cases the developing countries'
actions were, in fact, found to be in violation of TRIPs. However, in other
instances, the speculation and attempted enforcement by developed nations
was defeated by worldwide pressure.
1. India
India's 1970 patent law did not include patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and thus did not issue patents for such products.62
Additionally, in India, changes in a drug's production process do not
require re-approval for marketing, thus allowing manufacturers to begin
production and sale without revisiting the lengthy approval process
previously completed for the same product.63 Further, because India is a
developing country, it is not required to achieve full compliance with the
TRIPs Agreement until 2005.64
This situation has allowed India to become the location of numerous
independent drug manufacturers of generic equivalents of drugs originally
patented and produced by Western pharmaceutical companies. There are

58. Maria Julia Olivia, Intellectual Propertyin the FTAA: Little Opportunityand Much Risk,
19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 45, 61 (2003).
59. See Kara M. Bombach, Can South Africa FightAIDS? Reconciling the South African
Medicines and Related Substances Act With the TRIPs Agreement, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 273, 297
(2001).
60. Curti, supra note 53, at 484.
6 1. Sykes, supra note 40, at 62.
62. John H. Barton, TRIPs and the GlobalPharmaceuticalMarket; Can the Pharmaceutical
Industry Make Drugs Available to Developing Countries Without Compromising Its Research
Incentive?, HEALTH AFF. (May-June 2004).
63. Lanjouw, supra note 46.
64. Fact Sheet, supra note 54.
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an estimated 9000 registered small drug firms, 250 registered large drug
firms, and possibly another 7000 unregistered small drug-producing firms
in India.65 In addition, these generic manufacturers utilize the publicly
available research information from the Western patents to make further
improvements on the drugs which have profited the patent holders.66
As a result of the lack of R&D cost, the generic drugs produced by
Indian manufacturers are significantly cheaper than those produced by the
pharmaceutical companies who obtained a patent for their research. For
example, "a UN study showed that 150mg of the HIV drug Fluconazole
costs $55 in India, where it does not enjoy patent protection. However in
countries that do provide patent protection the cost for an equivalent
amount is much higher: $697 in Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia, and $817 in
the Philippines., 67 Such a disparity in price has caused many countries in
need of these drugs to rely on imports from Indian generics.
As a result of the Indian generic industry, the Indian government has
come under scrutiny from industrialized nations for violating the TRIPs
Agreement. The United States and the European Community brought
action against India in 1997 for failing to meet the requisite steps for full
TRIPs compliance. 68 The WTO panel agreed with the developed nations
and sanctioned India until it achieved the level deemed necessary to satisfy
the 2005 deadline for complete TRIPs compliance.69 When fully
compliant, the ability of Indian generic firms to freely produce patented
pharmaceuticals at mere fractions of the price will no longer be available.
The likely result will be that the price for such drugs will significantly
increase and the availability of such drugs to the Indian population "as
well as other nations who imported from Indian manufacturers" will
significantly decrease.
2. South Africa
South Africa has more people infected with HIV/AIDS than any other
country on Earth. The current number is above 4.7 million and continues

65. See id.
66. Kimberly A. Czub, Argentina's EmergingStandardoflntellectualPropertyProtection:
A Case Study of the Underlying Conflicts Between Developing Countries, TRIPs Standards,and
the United States, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191, 216 (2001).
67. Sykes, supranote 40, at 47.
68. Curti, supra note 53, at 478.
69. Id.
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to rise.7° South Africa also had some of the highest prices of
pharmaceuticals in the world despite its status as a developing country.7'
In response, South African President Nelson Mandela passed the
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act (Act) in an
attempt to make drugs cheaper and more available.72 Specifically, the Act
allowed the South African Minister of Health to grant compulsory licenses
for pharmaceuticals as long as the product was already being marketed by
the patent owner. 73 The Act did not restrict the use of compulsory licensing
to the degree that TRIPs requires and it neglected to mention the specific
conditions TRIPs requires to grant a compulsory license. 74 The Act also
encouraged the practice of parallel importation in order to further provide
medication to South Africans.75
Compulsory licensing is ideal for such a situation because it would
allow South Africa to produce generic drugs in a state laboratory and
control the distribution, at a potential discount of ninety percent over
private pharmaceutical costs. 76 Additionally, the potential for parallel
importation of drugs would allow South Africa to purchase a drug such as
Fluconazole from a generic producer in Thailand for $0.60 per dose when
the same drug cost $4.10 per dose from the patent holder.77
However, in response to the Act, the South African Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association and forty multinational manufacturers brought
a law suit against South Africa. 78 They claimed the Act violated TRIPs
through lax treatment of patent rights. 79 The United States and the
European Commission also supported their respective pharmaceutical
manufacturers in the suit against the South African government. 80 Further,
the United States withheld trade benefits and threatened further trade
sanctions if South Africa failed to repeal the Act.8 The pharmaceutical
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companies eventually dropped the case in 2001, but only in response to the
worldwide public outcry against the action.82 Subsequent to this decision,
the WTO released the Doha Declaration and clarified the flexibilities of
TRIPs and a country's ability to decide whether to grant a compulsory
license in response to public health and emergency needs.
3. Brazil
Brazil is an example to the rest of the developing world as to how
HIV/AIDS can be controlled. In the mid 1990s Brazil had an estimated
population of 536,000 people infected with HIV/AIDS.83 Attempting to
curb the outbreak, the Brazilian government used a loophole in its patent
laws called the "pipeline" provision." With the "pipeline" provision,
pending pharmaceutical patents in Brazil receive protection only if the
drug had been patented in another country and if no marketing or planned
marketing for sale had taken place by the pharmaceutical companies or
third parties." Basically, any drug that was being sold outside of Brazil did
not receive patent protection in Brazil, and a Brazilian generic producer
could freely manufacture the drug within Brazil.
Relying on the "pipeline" provision, the government of Brazil began
producing generic versions of the standard HIV/AIDS drugs in stateowned plants and the government began giving the generic drugs to
infected Brazilians for free.86 The results speak for themselves. Because of
the competition generated by the generic producers, the brand-name
versions of the AIDS drugs reduced their price by seventy-nine percent,
while the price of drugs which did not have a generic competitor fell by
only nine percent during the same three years.87 Further, because of the
effectiveness of the drugs, hospitalization costs of HIV/AIDS patients in
Brazil fell by $472 million over a two year period and HIV/AIDS
mortality rates in Brazil were reduced by fifty percent during the 19961999 period.88 The action by the Brazilian government is proof of what an
effective generic market for drugs could accomplish in the fight against
disease.
Alternatively, Brazil has threatened to use compulsory licensing in
negotiations simply to lower prices of other patented drugs. Such leverage
82.
83.
84.
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88.
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was provided by article 68 of the new Brazilian Industrial Property Code,
which required that Brazilian patent holders manufacture the patented
product in Brazil. 9 Ifthe patent holder failed to comply with this provision
for a three year period, the Brazilian government would grant a
compulsory license, unless it had been financially impossible for the patent
holder to comply with this regulation.90 Such a provision allowed the
Brazilian government to grant compulsory licenses under a much less
stringent standard than that under TRIPs.
Consequently, the United States initiated action against Brazil in 2001
at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, claiming that article 68 violated
TRIPs. 9' The United States argued that article 68 discriminated against
American owners of Brazilian patents and violated article 27.1 and article
28.1 of the TRIPs Agreement.92 In response, the Brazilian government
claimed that their compulsory licensing provision was compliant with
TRIPs, as well as article 5 of the Paris Convention, which is incorporated
into TRIPs through article 2.1.9 Article 5 of the Paris Convention stated
that "[e]ach country ...shall have the right to take legislative measures
",94
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses ....
In response, the United States received criticism from nongovernmental
organizations throughout the world, who felt the U.S. action would halt the
positive impact Brazil was making in their fight against HIV/AIDS. 9 5
Responding to this pressure, the United States withdrew its action against
Brazil on June 25, 2001.9' Eventually a compromise was reached between
the two nations. Brazil agreed to consult and negotiate with the United
States and the pharmaceutical manufacturers before granting any future
compulsory licenses.97
Although the point of disagreement between the United States and
Brazil stemmed from a provision of the Brazilian Code, the TRIPs
Agreement in fact specifically provided for the granting of such
compulsory licenses. Brazil could have produced the same drugs under the
"public non-commercial use" exception in article 31 of TRIPs because
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Brazil produced the pills in state-owned labs and distributed them to the
public for free.98
4. The United States
The United States is the world's leader in the R&D of new
pharmaceuticals. 99 This is likely a result of the strict American patent
scheme, which provides the incentive of strong patent rights to inventors.
In addition, the United States is one of the only developed nations without
national pharmaceutical pricing controls.' As a result, drug prices within
the United States are far greater than similarly situated nations such as
Canada. Many critics blame these high prices on the U.S. lawmaker's
susceptibility to the persuasiveness of lobbyists, who have received $236
million from the U.S. Pharmaceutical Association over a two year
period.101
This influence on the government from the private sector may explain
the consistent pressure the United States applies on developing nations
who stray even slightly from the requirements of the TRIPs Agreement.
The power to exert such pressure arises from § 301 of the 1974 U.S. Trade
Act, which allows private parties to force the U.S. Government to act any
time foreign trade practices have the potential to unfairly limit U.S.
commerce. 0 2 Further, the United States declared in the 1984 Trade and
Tariff Act that "intellectual property protection [is] explicitly actionable
under § 301."103 This language provides the wherewithal for private
pharmaceutical companies to use the U.S. government any time they feel
threatened.
Additionally, the U.S. Trade Representative is required to compose a
"watch list" of trading partners who fail to provide adequate IP rights to
U.S. companies even if the allowed rights are fully compliant with
TRIPs." ° When a country is placed on this list, the United States uses
§ 301 to revoke or threaten to revoke the "Most Favored Nation" status of
a nation until the desired changes are made to the identified nation's IP
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laws.' 0 5 This exertion of power seems to extend far beyond the scope of
TRIPs. The idea of TRIPs is to create a standard of "minimum" rights in
each nation, not to require rights equivalent to, or in excess of, the rights
established in industrialized nations with centuries of practice.
Recognizing such a disparity, the European Union initiated a WTO
Dispute Settlement action against the United States challenging the
validity of § 301 '6 In such disputes within the WTO, the general council
also functions as the Dispute Settlement Body.° 7 The argument presented
by the European Union claimed that article 23 of the Uruguay Round of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes prohibits the use of unilateral actions by WTO members.'0
Therefore, just as the United Nations requires of its members, WTO
members must also submit claims to the general body of the WTO, or, in
this case, the panel for Dispute Settlement, before initiating action against
another member nation.' 0 9 In fact, § 301(E) specifically requires an
investigation pursuant to an alleged violation of a trade agreement, such
as the WTO, and requires the U.S. Trade Representative to abide by the
dispute settlement provisions established by such a trade agreement."
Thus, unilateral action undertaken by the United States pursuant to § 301
is not only in violation of the WTO, but also the language of the U.S.
Trade Act.
The irony of the position taken by the United States is that the United
States often permits the practices for which it holds others accountable. In
particular, the United States uses threats of compulsory licenses within its
own borders."' However, in contrast to the reasons for granting
compulsory licenses that developing countries rely on, the United States
is not as stringent when operating domestically. For example, in the period
following the September 11, 2001 attacks, there was a panic in response
to threats of Anthrax poisoning. From the Anthrax scare, five fatalities
occurred." 2 German pharmaceutical giant Bayer AG had a patent for and
produced an antibiotic called Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride (Cipro) widely
105. Ford, supra note 21, at 947-48.
106. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPs Agreement Comes ofAge: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441,454 (2000).
107. ROEDERER & MOELLENDORF, supra note 4, at 599.
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believed to fight Anthrax poisoning." 3 The United States understandably
felt a need to stockpile a large amount of Cipro in case of future attacks.
Consequently, the U.S. government threatened to issue a compulsory
license to produce Cipro generically unless Bayer reduced the price." 4
However, this threat never materialized, most likely because of the
unwillingness of the United States to retreat from its consistently hard-line
stance on international patent rights.' The United States eventually
entered into an agreement to purchase one hundred million pills of Cipro
from Bayer AG at a discounted price." 6 The threat of granting a
compulsory license for this situation left many WTO members skeptical
of the motives of the United States.
The "public health" exception articulated in article 30 of TRIPs is
arguably a more valid excuse for compulsory licensing than stockpiling." 7
Stockpiling aims merely to protect the patented product's competitive
value, rather than correct an emergency."' This situation clearly outlined
the position of the United States when trade is concerned. The United
States seems to interpret TRIPs however it desires, so long as it benefits
the United States. Many in the developing world are left understandably
displeased when the United States maintains a policy under which it
simultaneously threatens to grant a compulsory license for itself in
response to five deaths, while maintaining a hard line position against poor
countries wishing to grant the same rights in response to spreading
diseases afflicting millions.'19
Additionally, the acts undertaken by the United States in issuing and
threatening to issue compulsory licenses after signing the TRIPs
Agreement is considered evidence of a "customary international law
norm" against which it may not later argue in similar cases involving other
WTO member nations. 20 The International Court of Justice declared that
"behavior after conclusion of the treaty may evince state practice out of a
sense of legal obligation." ' The United States should abide by the
customs it has helped to establish and allow developing nations in need,
to utilize compulsory licensing when it is deemed necessary. Such
cooperation from a powerful and developed nation, such as the United
113.
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115.
116.
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118.
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120.
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States, would undoubtedly help solidify the foundation of TRIPs, from
which new technologies in developing nations will possibly emerge.
C. Compulsory Licensing is Essentialto Combat the Spreadof Disease
Although the United States and other industrialized nations actively
participate in the TRIPs discussions, they also consistently attempt to
further strengthen the rights granted to patent holders seemingly without
regard for prevalent human rights interests. 2 2 The main arguments
presented by these developed countries for maintaining strong patent
regimes are: "(1) strong patent protection stimulates future innovations of
medical products; (2) patents encourage capital investment in
pharmaceutical companies; and (3) strong patent regimes attract direct
foreign investment, thereby benefiting developing nations in the long
term.' 23 In response, developing countries claim that any long term
benefits stemming from strong patent rights cannot help curb the current
public health crises.'24 Consequently, the possibility of a compulsory
license to produce generic drugs, outlined within TRIPs, provides an
immediate solution to the present problem of high pharmaceutical prices.
First of all, generic drugs can be produced for a fraction of the cost
because generic producers do not require research and development;
instead they obtain their knowledge from the patent once its contents are
made publicly available. 25 Therefore, if the developed nations were to
relax their policies on compulsory licensing with respect to disease control
in, at a minimum, less developed countries, producers of generic drugs
would potentially be able to increase quality through practice and stringent
standards.
However, the argument is valid that the infrastructure required to
effectively distribute these drugs is simply not present in the countries
most in need. 26 The generic or donated drug programs can be subject to
corruption by the leaders of developing nations. 127 There is also the
possibility that these drugs may be smuggled back into developed
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countries and sold at a lower cost than what the patent holders charge.
However, this has been happening for years within the United States when
Americans purchase drugs in Canada.' 28
Secondly, TRIPs requires manufacturers to separate their drugs issued
through compulsory license by identifiable markings.' 29 With the help of
the many international NGOs and Aid Organizations, such as The
International Dispensary Association and UNICEF, quality assurance in
distribution can be secured. 3 0
Parallel importing is clearly a dilemma. However, the world
community has chosen to remain neutral on this issue by removing
concrete rules from the TRIPs Agreement. 3' Thus, the individual nations
have the ability to decide whether parallel importing is feasible.'
D. BalancingProfits with Global Health Concerns
Many pharmaceutical companies have taken action to aid poor nations
in their fight against disease. Several have donated large quantities of their
drugs. One group of large manufacturers has pledged over $275 million
towards the fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa. 3 3 This is a number which
is larger than the amounts actually provided by many developed nations. 131
Most importantly, the drugs themselves would not be available to
anyone if not for the pharmaceutical producers. Because of the small
number of highly successful products, the twenty year market exclusivity
provided by patent protection is necessary to generate enough profit to
fund further research and development. 35 "[P]harmacueitcal companies
invest on the order of 12-19% of their sales revenue in research and
development."'' 36 Today, the average drug requires 12 years and $500
million to research and develop. 37 One major reason for this is the huge
sums spent on marketing and employee compensation packages. For
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example, in 2000, $2 billion was spent on media advertising by the
pharmaceutical industry.' 38 Even then, only 1 in 5,000 tested drugs will be
approved for patient use, and of those approved, only 3 out of 10 will
generate enough revenue to equal or exceed the cost of R&D. 39 After the
expiration of the 20-year patent term, the generics significantly increase
competition. "Industry experts say... 80% of profits are milked out of a
drug in the first 18 months of its reincarnation as a generic."' 14 Therefore,
the revenue generated by those few blockbuster products is vital to
innovation of new technology and possible new cures.
The potential for loss of revenue, however, by granting compulsory
licenses to poor nations, who could not afford the drugs in the first place,
would be minimal. Developing countries, which account for 75% of the
world's population, only account for 10% of the global pharmaceutical
market."'4 Additionally, with the assistance from NGOs and government,
widespread and costly media advertising can be arguably reduced in the
developing world, thus further lessening the cost to the pharmaceutical
companies. The TRIPs requirement to "adequately remunerate" the patent
holder provides additional tangible payment when a compulsory license
has been granted.'42
The Dispute Settlement Panel at the WTO could also provide an
adequate setting for unbiased negotiations between generic producers and
the pharmaceutical manufacturers.143 Such open negotiations could lead to
proper pricing and production schemes so as to satisfy the needs of both
parties. As such, while patent protection is necessary, the possibility of
reduction of cost as well as payment for use are potentially mechanisms
through which objectives of both sides could be achieved.

IV. CONCLUSION

Clearly, the battle between pharmaceutical patent rights and access to
these drugs is also a battle between industrialized nations pursuing very
strict patent rights and developing nations attempting to improve or
establish a system of patent rights to comply with TRIPs. Both sides use
the TRIPs Agreement for legal support. However, due to the ambiguous
nature of the wording in the TRIPs Agreement, interpretations vary.
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The WTO negotiations and TRIPs have been criticized as methods for
rich countries with established patent schemes to enforce unreasonable
demands on poor countries who are trying to gain access to the world
market.'" As a result, it is arguable that the bilateral negotiations held
when forming and enforcing TRIPs were merely protections of interests
of the developed countries at the expense of those who are
underdeveloped.' 45 Due to this potentially unfair limitation on fair trade,
the TRIPs Agreement, which attempts to introduce technology to poor
and access to the technology
regions, may eventually hinder innovation
46
world.
developed
the
available in
Recently, however, as a result of the Doha Declaration and the
Statement by the General Council, several industrialized nations, including
the United States, have committed not to use the new rules to import
pharmaceuticals and many other nations have agreed to use the new rules
only in situations of national emergency.'47 However, it is clear that
industrialized nations should also provide more assistance to developing
nations through a "Fair Followers Mentality" to improve their intellectual
property regimes. 48 This requirement to assist in the preparation of laws
and regulations is already codified in article 67 of TRIPs. However, the
industrialized nations should not provide assistance with the goal of
merely protecting their own interests. 49 The objectives of both developed
and developing countries must be equally respected and supported in order
for TRTPs to be effective.
There is a significant necessity in the underdeveloped world for new
technology and access to such technology, thus making it imperative for
a proper balance to be obtained. 5 ° Upon the achievement of such an
understanding by all WTO members, sufficient profit may be raised for
future R&D and inexpensive drugs may be distributed to control the
spread of disease.
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